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STRICTLY LIABLE AND NEGLIGENT
DEFENDENTS IN MAJOR AIRCRAFT
LITIGATION
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early days of the Common Law, English courts began
fashioning the concept of indemnity. Since that time courts and
litigants have been struggling with the problem of allocating dam-
ages between defendants. The development of the concepts of
indemnity and contribution in the United States has been on an
ad hoc basis resulting in a lack of conformity from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. During the past decade developments in the law of
strict liability have been superimposed on rapidly changing in-
demnity and contribution concepts, resulting in confusion for
courts and litigants faced with the application of these principles
in multi-jurisdiction aircraft litigation.
This paper will trace the background and development of the
concepts of indemnity and contribution and provide an overview
of the current law in selected jurisdictions in the United States.
It is hoped that this approach will facilitate an understanding of
the current law as well as aid litigants in predicting potential
changes through future legislation and court decisions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTS OF INDEMNITY
AND CONTRIBUTION
As early as 1799 the courts began struggling with the problem
of allocating the damages recovered by a plaintiff in a lawsuit be-
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tween one or more individuals who were somehow associated with
or responsible for the injury sustained by the plaintiff.1 Initially,
the courts recognized the right of one individual who was legally
responsible to the plaintiff for the plaintiff's damages, but who was
not guilty of any fault or wrongful conduct, to recoup his entire
loss from the individual whose fault or wrongful conduct gave rise
to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.' This right, characterized
as the right of indemnity by the courts, has also been recognized
by the various jurisdictions in the United States which have
adopted the common law.' Over the years the courts have defined,
developed, and modified their own rules governing the right of
indemnity and have established a number of tests to be applied to
different fact situations for the purpose of determining whether
the right of indemnity exists. Examples of the tests established by
the courts include the active-passive test," the primary-secondary
test,' and the duty versus no-duty test.! The courts' definitions of
each individual test have been vague and the application of each
test has been illogical and inconsistent.!
At the time these rules were developing to allow indemnity, the
courts did not attempt to allocate the loss if both of the parties
associated with or responsible for the plaintiff's injury were guilty
of some degree of fault or wrongdoing.' The courts allowed the
I Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
2d.
2 Huyett, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution Among
Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Huyett]; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 886B, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
'See Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp.
122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
' For example, a vicariously liable owner of an aircraft has been held to be
entitled to indemnity from the pilot who caused the harm. See Note, Torts-Joint
Enterprise Doctrine-A Flying School/Aircraft Owner is Engaged in a Joint
Enterprise with its Student Pilots and Is Vicariously Liable for the Student's Neg-
ligent Acts, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 511 (1975).
'South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 947 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
'This disparity is illustrated by comparing the following three cases: Ingham
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931
(1967); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964);
Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
1 Huyett, supra note 3, at 26.
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plaintiff to choose the party against whom he desired to recover
and did not allow that defendant to receive any reimbursement
from the other wrongdoer, reasoning that it was not the duty of
the courts to come to the aid of a wrongdoer.' Because of the
harshness of this rule, many jurisdictions in the United States have,
either statutorily or by judicial determination, relaxed the rule
against reimbursement to permit a recovery by one wrongdoer or
tort-feasor from another for a portion of the common liability, at
least among negligent tort-feasors, so long as the party seeking
partial recoupment has not been guilty of conduct characterized as
an intentional wrong."° This right was characterized as the right of
contribution and continues to be recognized by many of the juris-
dictions within the United States today.'
There is a glaring disparity among the various jurisdictions
within the United States as to the scope and application of this
doctrine, since each jurisdiction formulated its own rules of con-
tribution." For example, the question of contribution arises pri-
marily among joint tort-feasors, but confusion surrounds the defi-
nition of a joint tort-feasor, especially when strict product liability
allegations are injected into a case. Some jurisdictions define joint
tort-feasors as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in
tort for the same injury to persons or property."1 Those persons
"jointly or severally liable in tort" have been divided into three
categories:1" persons who knowingly join in the performance of a
tortious act; persons who fail to perform a common duty to the
plaintiff; and persons whose separate and independent acts concur
to produce the plaintiff's injury. Contribution arises almost exclu-
sively in situations within the third category."
"See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortleasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 130 (1932).10 Thirty-five states have divorced themselves from the common law antipathy
to contribution among tort-feasors. See Allen, Joint Tort!easors-A Case for Un-
limited Contribution, 43 Miss. L.J. 50, 55 (1972).
11 2B FRUMER, BENorr & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY, Contribution 5
1.01[1] (1967).
12Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case for Unlimited Contribution, 43 Miss.
L.J. 50, 55 (1972).
'
1 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Purdon 1967); HARPER & JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.0 (1956); 2B FRUMER, BENorr & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL
INJURY, Contribution S 1.01[1] (1967).
14 Huyett, supra note 3, at 126.
11Id. at 127.
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Additional confusion surrounds the proper method of allocating
the damages among the various defendants. Some jurisdictions
have allowed contribution according to the relative degree of fault
by such tort-feasor.'6 Other jurisdictions have refused to analyze
the degree of fault and have allocated the loss on a straight pro
rata basis, strictly according to the number of joint tort-feasors."
Further disparity has developed in the procedural routes which
a joint tort-feasor can choose to enforce his right of contribution.
Three such routes exist: 8 join the tort-feasor as a third-party de-
fendant in the original action; institute a post-judgment action for
contribution; or institute a post-settlement action for contribution.
Because of this procedural disparity, and the opportunities for col-
lusion inherent in permitting a party to seek recovery against any
one or more of the tort-feasors as he may choose, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1939,
drafted the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act." This
Act provided for the right of contribution among joint tort-feasors
and, in an optional section, authorized consideration of relative de-
grees of fault among such persons in determining each one's share
of common liability.
In 1955 a revised Act was drafted by the Commission contain-
ing a number of significant changes-the most important being
that in determining pro rata shares of common liability, relative
"'ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962); Schultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533,
169 S.W.2d 648 (1943); DEL. CODE tit. 10, 5 6302(d) (1975); Fehlhaber v.
Indian Trails, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 285 (D. Del. 1968); HAw. REv. STAT. S 663-12
(1968); Mitchell v. Branch, 45 HAW. 128, 363 P.2d 969 (1961); S.D. COMPILED
LAws ANN. S 15-8-15 (1967); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Bass v. United States,
379 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Colo. 1974); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169
(Me. 1971); Hillman v. Wallin, 298 Minn. 346, 215 N.W.2d 810 (1974); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1973); Gomes v. Brodhurst,
394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967) (V.I.); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d
105 (1962).
" Nordstrom v. District of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 327 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-
Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch.
231B, S 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25
N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957); Hutcherson v. State, 105 W. Va. 184, 142 S.E.
444 (1928).
' Huyett, supra note 3, at 128.
" UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1939).
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degrees of fault should not be considered."0 Most states adopting
either version of the Act have opted to avoid attempting to allo-
cate the loss according to the relative degree of fault in favor of
distributing the loss according to the number of parties sharing
in the common liability. 1
While the various jurisdictions within the United States were
developing rules of contribution and indemnity on an ad hoc basis,
some jurisdictions began undergoing a metamorphosis of substan-
tive tort law, struggling with new concepts of strict product liability
and comparative negligence. These substantive law developments
further compounded and complicated the problems of allocating
the loss between two or more persons responsible for or associated
with injuries sustained by a plaintiff."
Today at least thirty-one statesP' apply the principle of strict lia-
bility to the law of products liability. Conflict between strict liability
and some of the long established concepts of tort law has accom-
panied the adoption of this principle. Negligence, which the con-
cept of strict liability was designed to replace in the field of prod-
ucts liability, is indicative of such conflicts. Contribution among
tort-feasors is a corollary of negligence and, like negligence, its
underlying policies and rationale clash with those underlying strict
liability. This conflict is clearly illustrated when considering whether
a right of contribution exists between a tort-feasor strictly liable
and a tort-feasor negligently liable.2 '
20 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (revised 1955).
21See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 6302(d)
(1975); Fehlhaber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 285 (D. Del. 1968); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-12 (1968); Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 363 P.2d 969
(1961); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15 (1967); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010
to 09.16.060 (1970); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 231, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law Co-op
1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ lB-1 to IB-6 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01
to 32-38-04 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to 23-3106 (1976).
"Compare Texas, which has adopted both comparative negligence (TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1973)) and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A (1965) but has not extended comparative negligence
to products liability [see Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)] with Wisconsin, which has adopted comparative
negligence (judicially in Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962)) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and has applied
comparative negligence to products liability [Bielski v. Schulze].
2For a list of these jurisdictions, see Reitz and Seabolt, Warranties and
Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 531 (1973).
"While the list is by no means exhaustive, compare jurisdictions allowing
contribution in a strict liability case to jurisdictions which do not:
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Historically, negligence predominated as the method of establish-
ing liability for victims of accidents caused by defective products."
For an individual to be held liable in tort, aside from a determina-
tion that his actions actually caused the injury, a finding of fault in
his conduct was necessary." Strict liability in tort, on the other
hand, asserts responsibility for conduct which is neither intention-
al nor negligent; the responsibility is based on the condition of the
product. Unlike negligence, in which the injured plaintiff as a pre-
requisite to recovery must sue the seller who caused the defect, in
strict liability the injured person may sue anyone within the chain
of distribution of the product."
In the products liability field there have been far more actions
for indemnity than for contribution. Most of the actions for indem-
nity have arisen between members of the chain of distribution of
a defective product.' The cases usually involve the owner or dis-
tributor, held liable for an injury as a matter of law (such as strict
liability) or in contract (such as warranty), proceeding against the
previous seller or manufacturer who was primarily responsible for
the defect in the product which caused the injury."°
The adoption of comparative negligence principles in some juris-
dictions has further compounded the already difficult problems of
Contribution allowed: Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc.
v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Dole
v. Dow Chemical, 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d
288 (1972); Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stromme, 4
Wash. App. 85, 479 P.2d 554 (1971); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
Contribution refused: Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa.
Super. Ct. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) but see
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
25James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REV. 192, 227 (1956).
" Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964
U. ILL. L. F. 693 (1964).
2 See MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 391, 257 A.2d
676, 680 (1954).
"
8 See Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 344, 237 A.2d 593, 597 (1968).
294c FRUMER and FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Indemnity S 1.03[111]
(1971).
9 0 McCrory Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 45, 307 A.2d
435 (1973).
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applying the concept of contribution between defendants. Some
jurisdictions had the foresight to anticipate problems of contribu-
tion and indemnity and addressed these problems within their stat-
utes. For example, the comparative negligence statute in Texas sets
out specific guidelines for apportioning the loss according to the
relative degree of causal negligence." What the statute does not do
is address the problem of contribution in cases involving both alle-
gations of negligence and strict liability.' Other jurisdictions have
not attempted to address the problem of contribution and indem-
nity at all.
The final and most significant complicating factor in the ap-
plication of contribution and indemnity concepts has been conflicts
of law problems. Up until early 1960 the conflicts problems were
only moderately difficult. Prior to the 1960's the states' conflicts
laws uniformly applied a lex loci delicti test; therefore, the sub-
stantive law of the state where the accident occurred was applied.
Two things happened to complicate the picture. First, the courts
began on rare occasions to hold that public policy required the ap-
plication of the state's own substantive law rather than the law of
the state where the accident occurred.' Second, states began apply-
ing a "significant contacts" test to determine which state's substan-
tive law should be applied." Thus, in a major accident involving
multiple plaintiffs, various federal courts could make independent
determinations, based upon different criteria, of the law applicable
to the case.
It is therefore apparent that the complexities of predicting rules
of contribution and indemnity in cases involving allegations of
strict liability, negligence, and comparative negligence are of tre-
mendous proportions.
Ill. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS
Currently, various jurisdictions within the United States are
struggling with the question of whether contribution is available
31 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
32 Id.
Kilbert v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172
N.E.2d 526 (1961).
"4Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 11-16, 203 A.2d 796, 802-06
(1964).
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in cases involving both strict liability and negligence theories.' In
attempting to resolve this initial question the courts have recog-
nized several factors to be considered: the type of tort-feasors in-
' States adhering to the common-law rule, rejecting the general right of con-
tribution: Gobble v. Bradford, 226 Ala. 517, 147 So. 619 (1933) [Alabama
courts recognize an exception where the injury-causing wrong amounts to a breach
of duty as between the joint tort-feasors.]; State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Factory
Mutual Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 199, 526 P.2d 406 (1974); Colorado & S. Ry.
v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1923); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 112 F. Supp. 276 (D. Conn. 1953); Souto v. Segal, 302
So. 2d 465 (Fla. App. 1974); Gertz v. Campbell, 55 II. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40
(1973); Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937); Panasuk v.
Seaton, 277 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968); Graveline v. D. F. Sullivan Auto
Co., 81 N.H. 279, 124 A. 552 (1924); Sobocinski v. City of Cleveland, 133
N.E.2d 622 (Ohio App. 1956); National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority, 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); American Fid. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 251 S.C. 507, 163 S.E.2d 926 (1968); Howard
v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974); Puyallup v. Vergowe, 95 Wash.
320, 163 P. 779 (1917).
States permitting contribution under varying circumstances-by legislation:
Some states allow contribution only between defendants against both of whom
judgments have been recovered: CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §5 875-78 (West
Supp. 1975-1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1966); KAN. STAT. § 60-2413
(1963) [interpreted to allow contribution between joint judgment debtors in a
tort action, McKinney v. Miller, 204 Kan. 436, 464 P.2d 276 (1970)]; LA. CODE
Civ. PRO. ANN. arts. 2103-2104 (West 1961); MIcH. STAT. ANN. S 600.2925(a)(Supp. 1977-78); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. 5 537.060(1959); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw S 1402 (McKinney 1976); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13
(1966).
Sixteen states have statutes providing for contribution without any recovery
of judgment: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1947 & Supp. 1959); HAW.
REV. STAT. §5 663-11 to 663-17 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1959); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 231, §5 1-4(West 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to 2A:53A-5 (1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to 18 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 IB-1 to 1B-7 (1969); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); OR. REV. STAT. § 18-440 to 18-460
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §5 2082-2089 (Supp. 1960); R.I. GEN LAWS§§ 10-6-1 to 11 (1956 & Supp. 1960); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §5 33.04A01-
.04A10 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon
1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §5 78-27-39 to 78-27-43 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE
8-627 (1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01-1 to 113-10 (1957).
By judicial decision: See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394
F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d
219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Wiener v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal.
1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sport. Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Bedell v. Reagan,
159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Duluth M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn.
414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193
Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
Comparing jurisdictions on whether contribution is allowed in a products
liability action, see note 24 supra.
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volved; whether common liability exists; and whether one or more
of the tort-feasors has settled with the plaintiff and been released
from further liability.
Originally, the "type" tort-feasor concept was applied in the con-
text of the willful or wanton tort-feasor, to deny such tort-feasors
the right of contribution. At common law the courts refused to allow
contribution in this context, reasoning that the courts would not
come to the aid of a wrongdoer. Today, although the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions which have addressed this question deny
contribution to intentional or willful tort-feasors, there has been
some effort to abandon this concept.' Some jurisdictions have at-
tempted to utilize the "type" tort-feasor concept in actions where
a strictly liable tort-feasor seeks contribution from a negligently li-
able tort-feasor. In 1969 a federal district court sitting in the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania used such reasoning in denying a claim
for contribution between a party strictly liable and a party negli-
gently liable.37 That court reasoned that there is no right to contri-
bution "between those whose liability is imposed under different
grounds."3 Thereafter, in 1973, another federal district court sit-
ting in Pennsylvania held that a right of contribution between one
strictly liable and one negligently liable does exist. 9 In doing so, the
court distinguished strict liability from willful and wanton liability,
,6 Jurisdictions not allowing contribution to an intentional tort-feasor: Wiener
v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962), afl'd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 951 (1964); Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 641 (1961); Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); GA. CODE
ANN. § 105-2012(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); McDonald v. Trampf, 49 Ill. App. 2d
106, 198 N.E.2d 537 (1964); Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248 (1857); Best v. Yerkes,
247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245
Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815
(1918); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391, 48 N.W.2d 567
(1951); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d
183 (1975); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns Ch. 131 (N.Y. 1816); N.D. CENT. CODE §5
32-38-01 to -04 (1960); Jachman v. Jones, 198 Or. 564, 258 P.2d 133 (1953);
Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Davis v.
Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); Norfolk Southern
R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934); Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt.
78 (1870); Crum v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 29 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. W. Va.
1939). Jurisdiction allowing contribution to an intentional tort-feasor: Judson
v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
" Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
3, Id. at 262.
"
9Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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pointing out that the reason contribution is unavailable to a willful
and wanton wrongdoer is that the courts should not aid one whose
acts imply moral turpitude."0 There is no implication of moral tur-
pitude, the court noted, on the part of one strictly liable."' One
party, seeking to avoid contribution, argued that to hold that no
right of contribution exists in this type of situation would be in
keeping with the intent of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A, that the manufacturer of products must bear the entire loss
even though there is negligence on the part of others in bringing
about such loss.' The court rejected this reasoning, stating that the
policy reasons given for the adoption of § 402A are for the protec-
tion of the injured consumer and not for the protection of an un-
injured third party whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff's
injury.'
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington, in Northwest-
ern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stromme," allowed contribution be-
tween a negligently liable tort-feasor and a strictly liable tort-feas-
or, discounting the policies underlying § 402A and reasoning in
terms of fault.' In Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co.," a federal
district court sitting in Pennsylvania allowed contribution between
a strictly liable tort-feasor and a negligently liable tort-feasor, rea-
soning that contribution is intended to relieve tort-feasors of injus-
tice among themselves and to achieve sharing of common responsi-
bility according to natural justice and equity. Thereafter, the same
federal district court held that a strictly liable manufacturer was
not entitled to contribution from a negligent user tort-feasor.' The
court's rationale was that contribution is available only to joint tort-
feasors who are "in pari delicto" (of equal fault), and that to be
in pari delicto the joint tort-feasor must first be "in aequali juri"




4I id. at 1003.
"4 Wash. App. 85, 479 P.2d 554 (1971).
479 P.2d at 556.
"485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
4'Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
48 Id.
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social principles of strict liability require that the seller (strictly
liable manufacturer) and the protected user (negligent tort-feasor)
not be treated as in aequali juni.4
At least two other jurisdictions have arrived at the opposite re-
sult-the right of contribution does not exist between a strictly
liable defendant and a negligently liable defendant." In this regard,
an Illinois court refused to allow a strictly liable defendant to shift
a portion of the loss to a negligently liable defendant under the
guise of contribution because the underlying purpose of strict li-
ability law is to place the risk of loss on the manufacturer of a de-
fective product." In doing so, the court judicially ignored the in-
demnitee's fault, stating that there is "a strong public policy that
insists upon the distribution of the economic burden in the most so-
cially desirable manner, even to the extent of ignoring the indemni-
tee's fault."
' '
In slight contrast, one Texas court refused to allow a strictly li-
able defendant to recover contribution from a negligently liable de-
fendant, reasoning that the negligently liable defendant owed "no
duty" to the strictly liable defendant." This decision, however, has
been modified by a very recent decision which allowed contribution
by a strictly liable defendant against a negligently liable defend-
ant.5
In most states, before the right of contribution may be asserted,
there must be a common legal liability on the part of the tort-feas-
ors toward the injured person.' For common liability to exist, the
49 1d. at 1319.
"Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973),
aff'd, 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d
916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); but see General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.)
1976, no writ).
"Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(1969).
52 Id. at 358, 254 N.E.2d at 588.
5"Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
"General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
"See cases listed at 19 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1951). For a more detailed discussion
see Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tort!easor Enjoys a
Special Defense Against Action by the Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407
(1967). In a minority of jurisdictions, there is no need for common liability, and
the Uniform Act is construed accordingly. See Huyett, supra note 3, at 132.
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plaintiff must have a cause of action against each tort-feasor from
whom contribution is sought. At the time of the tort, if one of the
tort-feasors has a personal defense, such as immunity, against the
injured party, common liability is impossible." The joint tort-feasor
who does not enjoy such a defense, even though he is no more culp-
able than a tort-feasor with a special defense, must pay the plain-
tiff's entire loss.
Workmen's compensation law presents an example of a special
defense. These laws have been interpreted by the overwhelming
majority of states as precluding the establishment of the common
liability requirement." When an employee's injury is caused by a
third party outside of the employment relationship, the employee
is permitted to pursue an action at common law against the third
party. The difficulty arises when the employee's injury is a result
of the joint wrongdoing of the employer and the third party, and,
after the employee brings an action against the third party, the
third party seeks to join the employer to enforce his right of con-
tribution. For example, in Kantlehner v. United States,8 the plain-
tiff, a flight engineer for Pan American, sued the government for
negligence. The government attempted to implead Pan American
for contribution and indemnity. Pan American pleaded that pay-
ment of workmen's compensation constituted a complete defense to
the third-party claim against the employer for contribution. The
judge agreed and dismissed the impleader action, 9 reasoning that
Only four states have adopted this minority position, and of these four states,
only Rhode Island has the first Uniform Act as its statutory form of contribution.
See Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Bellefeuille v. City
& County Savings Bank, 74 Misc. 2d 534, 345 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
afl'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 335, 351 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1974); Zarrella v. Miller, 100
R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966).
"e In the case of common-law joint tortfeasors, the overwhelming weight of
authority holds to the view that where the concurring negligence of the party
from whom contribution is sought gives the injured party no cause of action
against him, the claimant cannot recover contribution, even though such concur-
ring negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Panichella v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 351 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
5 See Note, Workmen's Compensation Third Party Tort-Feasor Actions, 16
DRAKE L. REV. 93 (1967); Note, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 939 (1956).
58279 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
591 Id. at 129.
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the parties were "in pani delicto" so that indemnity was not avail-
able. °
In contrast, the New York courts have held that a negligent
third party might bring in the employer for purposes of indemnity,




A similar split in authority currently exists concerning the limi-
tation provisions in the Federal Employers Liability Act."' In Wey-
erhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States," a privately owned
ship collided with an Army dredge injuring a civilian employee of
the United States. The Court held, notwithstanding the exclusive
remedy clause, that the United States was still liable in contribution
for one-half of the total liabilities incurred by the owner of the
privately owned ship due to the government employee's injuries."
Three weeks later the Supreme Court,' following Weyerhaeuser in
a non-admiralty suit, vacated a Third Circuit decision which had
held that the exclusive remedy clause precluded contribution from
the United States for liabilities incurred because of injuries to gov-
ernment employees and remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of Weyerhaeuser."
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has allowed indemnity or contribu-
tion." A plurality of the court of appeals, however, has conclud-
60 Id.
61 Bellefeuille v. City & County Savings Bank, 74 Misc. 2d 534, 345 N.Y.S.2d
409 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 335, 351 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1974).
625 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970). The Act states:
(c) The liability of the United States or an instrumentality
thereof under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect
to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all
other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the em-
ployee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and
any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the
United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death
in a direct judicial proceedings, in a civil action, or in admiralty,
or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen's
compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute. How-
ever, this subsection does not apply to a master or a member of a
crew of a vessel.
63 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
4Id. at 600.
' Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963) (per curiam).
66 Id.
67 See Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
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ed that a third-party claim for contribution or indemnity against
the United States does not lie, either because of the language of the
exclusive remedy provision or because of the extinguishment of
the United States' underlying tort liability to its employees. 8
The effect the limitations afforded airlines under the Warsaw
Conventione' and Montreal Agreement"' would have on a claim for
contribution against an airline has apparently never been litigated.
Ostensibly, the jurisdictions allowing contributions against an em-
ployer, despite the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation
Statute, would disregard the limitations of the Convention, whereas
the jurisdictions which honor the limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Statute would also honor the limitations of the Con-
vention.
Further, the limits of liability afforded an airline under the War-
saw Convention, Article 25, are removed if the carrier or an agent
or servant of the carrier is guilty of willful misconduct.' As previ-
ously discussed,' there is a decisive split between the various juris-
dictions within the United States concerning whether a party guilty
of willful misconduct would be entitled to contribution. Thus, a
claim for contribution in an action involving a finding of willful
misconduct on the part of the airline would ostensibly be depend-
ent upon the state's law which the court chose to apply.
Jurisdictions in the United States also disagree concerning the
effect of settlements, releases, and covenants not to sue with regard
to the right of contribution and indemnity and the rights of a non-
settling tort-feasor to an offset or credit against the amount of any
judgment entered by the court." For example, in Kohr v. Allegheny
68 For a full review of the relevant cases, See Employee's Compensation Act-
Recovery Over, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 616 (1972). United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Galima v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975);
New Port Air Park v. United States, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
"Warsaw Convention, signed Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter, Warsaw Convention].
'
0 Montreal Agreement, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1970).
71 Cf. Sheris v. The Sheris Co., 12 Av. Cas. 17,394 (Va. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 878 (1972).
7"See cases cited note 36 supra.
"Effect of settlement by a tort-feasor: the question generally depends upon
whether the particular jurisdiction limits contribution to those against whom
judgment have been rendered, which fix both liability and amount. Such jurisdic-
tions include: CAL. CIv. PROC. §§ 875-80 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976) (see
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Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873, 14 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961)); GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1966); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.2925a-d
(Supp. 1977-1978); Mo. REv. STAT. 5 537.060 (1953); State ex rel. McClure v.
Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw 55 1401-
1404 (McKinney 1974); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229
N.W.2d 183 (1975); Vaughan v. Gill, 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1953); W. VA.
CODE § 55-7-1la-12-13 (1977); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481
(4th Cir. 1947).
Where there are no such provisions, it is generally held that one who settles
without judgment may recover contribution. See Zontelli v. Northern Pacific R.R.,
263 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1959); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp.
14 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Sleck v. Butler Bros., 53 Ill. App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64
(1964); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Louie Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d
421 (1959); O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co., 201 Md. 345, 94 A.2d 26 (1953);
Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252, 250 A.2d 13 (1969); Swartz v. Sunderland,
403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961). Massachusetts allows a separate action for
contributions regardless of whether judgment has been entered, if the party seek-
ing contribution paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability. See
MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 231B §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law Co-op 1974); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961). Tort-feasors
who have paid a claim in full may have a cause of action for contribution if the
compromise was made in good faith. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); Carolina Coach CO. v. Cox, 337 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1964); Reynolds
v. Southern R.R., 320 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Lexington Glass Co. v.
Zurich Gen. Acc. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1954); Samuelson v. Chi-
cago, R.I. & Pac. R., 287 Minn. 264, 178 N.W.2d 620 (1970); Farmers Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959).
However, he is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement. See
United States v. Reilly, 385 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1967); Allbright Bros. Con-
tractors v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953); Lacewell v. Griffin,
214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d 227 (1949).
Effect of release or covenant not to sue contained in the settlement: The
common-law rule that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases all is still re-
tained in a few jurisdictions. See Price v. Baker, 143 Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90
(1959); McCloskey v. Porter, 161 Mont. 307, 506 P.2d 845 (1973); Bland v.
Warwichshirz Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168 S.E. 443 (1933); Haney v. Cheatam, 8
Wash. 2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941) [but see Richardson v. Pacific Power &
Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941)]. Most jurisdictions have modi-
fied or abrogated the common-law rule by legislation or judicial decision. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1001 (1941); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 768.041 (West 1967
& Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 50, 55 16-24 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, 55 2082-2089 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN.
SS 15-8-11 to 15-8-22 (1969); see also McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1943). Where a defendant settles with plaintiff and receives a release or a
covenant not to sue, the usual holding is that the defendant is not released from
contribution. See Hodges v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 91 A.2d 473 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1952); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27,
99 N.W.2d 421 (1959); Leitner v. Hawkins, 311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988
(1949); Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968);
Michelucci v. Bennett, 73 Misc. 2d 621, 341 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1973);
Compare Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300
(1900) with Bacik v. Weaver, 173 Ohio St. 214, 180 N.E.2d 820 (1962); State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d
425 (1953). The more modem view is that the effect of a release is a question
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Airlines, Inc.,' two of the original defendants settled with the plain-
tiffs and then sued the other defendants for indemnity and contri-
bution. ' The court allowed the action for contribution and indem-
nity, reasoning that settlements should be encouraged and to deny
a settling tort-feasor the right to claim contribution or indemnity
would discourage settlement. Similarly, a New York court allowed
a settling tort-feasor to seek contribution or indemnity from a third
party provided the settling tort-feasor could prove the settlement
was reasonable. ' If the settling tort-feasor was not guilty of negli-
gence, however, this settlement would be considered a volunteer
payment and the settling tort-feasor would not be entitled to con-
tribution or indemnity." New York courts also allow a non-settling
defendant to bring a settling defendant back into the action on a
claim for contribution or indemnity. 8 In doing so, the courts reason
that to deny a non-settling tort-feasor the right to seek contribution
from a settling tort-feasor would result in "a disproportionate shift-
ing of liability to the non-settling tort-feasor regardless of his actual
degree of blame." ' In contrast, California courts have reached the
opposite conclusion, reasoning that to allow contribution would
tend to discourage settlement.8"
Recently, both the New York"' and Texas" legislatures have
of the intent of the parties and of whether full compensation has been received;
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show actual intent of the parties. See McKenna
v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. United
States, 201 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1952); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64
N.W.2d 159 (1954); Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187
N.E.2d 556 (1962); Restifo v. McDonald, 425 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 299 (1967).
See also Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Ash v. Morten-
sen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1955); Wheat v. Canter, 79 N.H. 150, 106
A. 602 (1919); contra, Norton v. Benjamin, 200 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966); Farrar
v. Wolfe, 357 P.2d 1005 (Okla. 1960).
74504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
Id. at 402.
D'Arcangelo v. Burnett, 78 Misc. 2d 118, 355 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
" Trojcak v. Wrynn, 45 App. Div. 2d 770, 357 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1974).
71 Blass v. Hennessy, 44 App. Div. 2d 405, 355 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1974).
78 1d. at 407, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08. Accord, Sage v. Hale, 80 Misc. 2d 812,
364 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Michelucci v. Bennett, 73 Misc. 2d 621, 341
N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
goStambaugh v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132
Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); Kemp v. Barnett, 62 Cal. App. 3d 245, 132 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1976).
s' N.Y. CPLR, Art. 14 (Gen. Oblg. L. § 15-108) (1974).
8 2 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon 1973). The statute pro-
vides:
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passed new statutes to ensure that the nonsettling tort-feasor would
not be burdened with more than his equitable share because another
tort-feasor had chosen to settle.
Section 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or party or the legal representative of any
person or party to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or injury to persons or property if such negligence is not greater
than the negligence of the person or party or persons or parties
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
the person or party recovering.
Section 2. (a) In this section:
(1) "Claimant" means any party seeking relief, whether he
is a plaintiff, counterclaimant, or cross-claimant.
(2) "Defendant" includes any party from whom a claimant
seeks relief.
(b) In a case in which there is more than one defendant, and
the claimant's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of
all defendants, contribution to the damages awarded to the claimant
shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable
to each defendant.
(c) Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire
amount of the judgment awarded the claimant, except that a de-
fendant whose negligence is less than that of the claimant is liable
to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment which repre-
sents the percentage of negligence attributable to him.
(d) If an alleged joint tort-feasor pays an amount to a claimant
in settlement, but is never joined as a party defendant, or having
been joined, is dismissed or nonsuited after settlement with the
claimant (for which reason the existence and amount of his negli-
gence are not submitted to the jury), each defendant is entitled to
deduct from the amount for which he is liable to the claimant a
percentage of the amount of the settlement based on the relation-
ship the defendant's own negligence bears to the total negligence
of all defendants.
(e) If an alleged joint tort-feasor makes a settlement with a
claimant but nevertheless is joined as a party defendant at the time
of the submission of the case to the jury (so that the existence and
amount of his negligence are submitted to the jury) and his per-
centage of negligence is found by the jury, the settlement is a com-
plete release of the portion of the judgment attributable to the per-
centage of negligence found on the part of that joint tort-feasor.
(f) If the application of the rules contained in Subsections (a)
through (e) of this section results in two claimants being liable to
each other in damages, the claimant who is liable for the greater
amount is entitled to a credit toward his liability in the amount of
damages owed him by the other claimant.
(g) All claims for contribution between named defendants in the
primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a
named defendant may proceed against a person not a party to the
primary suit who has not effected a settlement with the claimant.
(h) This section prevails over Article 2212, Revised Civil Statutes
of Texas, 1925, and all other laws to the extent of any conflict.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 41, ch. 28, §§ 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1973.
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After the court makes the initial determination that contribution
or indemnity is available, it must still determine how to allocate
the common liability." At least two jurisdictions seem to be in
agreement that the previously separate concepts of indemnity and
contribution have been merged and the allocation is simply on the
basis of fault." Under this system, the fact finder is given the obli-
gation of allocating the common liability. For example, in Walsh
v. Ford Motor Co.,' both the manufacturer and dealer of a car-
buretor were found to be negligent in failing to inspect and test the
carburetor. The judge decided that the relative fault was seventy-
five per cent for the manufacturer (fifty per cent for negligent man-
ufacture and twenty-five per cent for negligent failure to inspect
and test) and twenty-five per cent for the dealer." In Coons v.
Washington Mirror Works, Inc.,°" one defendant was liable on the
theory of negligence and a second defendant was liable on the
theory of breach of warranty. The judge decided to allocate fifty
per cent of the losses to each defendant."8
In the jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence
principles, either by statute or judicial decision, decisive splits exist
concerning whether comparative negligence concepts apply to the
doctrine of contribution, 9 and whether they apply to the doctrine
"The three basic methods are contribution, indemnity, and subrogation. E.g.,
indemnity: Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
subrogation: Horton v. Continental Cas. Co., 72 Ga. App. 594, 34 S.E.2d 605
(1945). Contribution is generally granted either on relative degrees of fault,
see Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) or on a pro rata
basis, see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1976). Jurisdictions may recognize both contribution and comparative neg-
ligence, see note 16 supra. Jurisdictions recognizing comparative negligence may
follow one of four different varieties: (1) "pure," see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
art. 14-A, § 1411 (McKinney 1975); (2) "not as great as" type (49% system),
see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1955); (3) "not greater than" type (50%
system), see, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1973);
(4) "slight v. gross" system, see, e.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1967).
"Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); and Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). 105
(1962).
"70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct., Trial Term 1972).
I81d. at 113.
8 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
" Id. at 658.
"gCompare Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975) with Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & S. Transport Corp., 56 Wis.
2d 383, 386, 202 N.W.2d 268, 270 (1972).
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of contribution between the strictly liable and negligently liable
tort-feasors."° In Texas," for example, the comparative negligence
statute expressly states that contribution will be based upon the
relative degree of causal negligence of each joint tort-feasor, but
the Texas courts have not applied this statute to an action involv-
ing strict liability."2
In California, the right to contribution is defined statutorily."'
Contribution on a pro rata basis is allowed when judgment has
been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort ac-
tion and one tort-feasor has either paid more than his pro rata
share or discharged the joint judgment. Recent decisions by the
California Court of Appeals" indicate that contribution will con-
tinue to be on a pro rata basis despite a landmark decision by the
California Supreme Court which judicially abolished the rule of
contributory negligence and replaced it with a doctrine of "pure"
comparative negligence."
In slight contrast, the Alaska Supreme Courtr recognized pure
comparative negligence as a defense in a strict liability action. Al-
though the case involved an action between a negligent plaintiff
and a strictly liable defendant, the court's reasoning could easily
be molded to control the rights of a strictly liable defendant seek-
ing contribution from a negligently liable defendant. The court
reasoned that pure comparative negligence could provide a predi-
cate of fairness in products liability cases in which the plaintiff and
defendant contribute to the injury. The defendant would be strictly
"See note 89 supra.
01 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon 1973). See note 82 supra
for text of the statute.
92Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
"2 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-80 (West Supp. 1977).
94 See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1976); Stambaugh v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 62 Cal. App. 3d
231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); E. B. Wills Co., Inc. v. Superior Court of Merced
County, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976). But see American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 65 Cal. App. 3d
694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977).
9 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
mid. at 808, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
'
7 Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas.
1976).
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liable due to the existence of a defective condition in the product,
but the award of damages could be reduced in proportion to the
plaintiff's contribution to his injury."' The court further stated that
the defense of comparative negligence was not limited to those
cases in which the plaintiff used the product with knowledge of the
defective condition, but also to those cases where the plaintiff mis-
used the product." In a dissenting opinion,1" Judge Burke criticized
the court's decision as a step backward because it ignored the fun-
damental policy considerations that gave rise to the doctrine of
strict liability in products liability cases.
Similarly, comparative negligence concepts were applied to a
products liability action by an Idaho court in Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp.1' In that case, an airline and rela-
tives of persons killed in a crash of one of the airline's planes
brought actions against the manufacturer, claiming that the crash
was caused by a defect in the plane."' The jury attributed ninety
per cent of the cause of the crash to the airline and ten per cent to
the plane manufacturer."° The court held that the Idaho compara-
tive causation law applied to this products liability action, reason-
ing that a violation of a duty owed, whether it be labeled negligence
or strict liability, is blameworthy or culpable conduct and can be
apportioned by the fact finder."' The court felt that strict liability
was like negligence per se and was capable of causal comparison,
91 Id. at 45, 46.
99 Id. at 46.
100 Id. at 47.
Burke stated:
As articulated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962), "The purpose of such liabil-
ity is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.
Clearly, this underlying policy will be given little effect if a plaintiff is to be
held responsible for his own injuries, to the extent that those injuries are caused
by his own ordinary negligence, when he is not aware of the defect and the dan-
gers associated with that defect. Accordingly, I would hold that a plaintiff's own
negligence is relevant only in those cases where he is aware of a specific defect
and voluntarily proceeds to encounter a known danger.
101411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976).
10
2 Id. at 598.
103 Id. at 601.
104 Id. at 602.
1977] INDEMNITY BETWEEN DEFENDANTS
and found this rationale was supported by case law as well as the
writing of commentators." Further, although there was no question
of contribution involved, the court concluded that comparative
causation could easily facilitate the law of contribution."
Similarly, the Wisconsin courts have applied their comparative
negligence statute to products liability actions, stating that com-
parative fault replaces the defense of abnormal use or misuse."°7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the comparative negli-
gence statute applies to the allocation of common liability between
joint tort-feasors in a products liability action, stating that indem-
nity was no longer available after the adoption of the comparative
negligence statute, since the purpose of the comparative negligence
statute was to eliminate the "all or none" concept."8
There are decisive differences among the various jurisdictions of
the United States concerning the use of the comparative negligence
doctrine," the application of comparative negligence in products
liability cases,"' and the application of comparative negligence to
10 Id. at 603.
10 Id. at 604.
10'E.g., Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810
(1973); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207
N.W.2d 866 (1973); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
108 Paschowitz v. Milwaukee & S. Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 386, 202
N.W.2d 286, 270 (1972).
109 Presently, thirty states, either by statute or by judicial decision, have adopt-
ed comparative negligence-by statute: ARK. STAT. ANN. 55 27-1763 to 27-1765
(1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572(h)
(1973); GA. CODE ANN. 5 94-703, 105-603 (1972); HAW. REV. STAT. 1968
§ 663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-801 to 6-806 (Supp. 1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 5 60-258a (1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (1965); MASS.
GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 231, 5 85 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1969);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 5 58-607.1 (1975);
NEB. REV. STAT. S 25-1151 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to
2A:15-5.3 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §5 11-12 (Supp. 1976);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1976); S.D.
COMP. LAws § 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2
(Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. 55 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 5 1036 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp.
1976); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1966).
-by judicial decision: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); and
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
"10 Five states have comparative negligence statutes which appear to apply to
tort liability in general: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1975); ME.
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contribution."' Various jurisdictions have also adopted different
types of comparative negligence."' Eight states have "pure" com-
parative negligence, that is, even if the plaintiff was ninety per cent
at fault, he can still recover ten per cent of his damages."' Ten have
adopted the "not as great as" type, that is, if the plaintiff is forty-
nine per cent at fault he may recover, but he cannot recover if he
is at least fifty per cent at fault."' Eleven states have adopted a "not
greater than" type of comparative negligence, that is, if the plaintiff
REV. STAT. tit. 14 S 156 (1965); see George v. Guerette, 306 A.2d 138 (Me.
1973); Miss. CODE ANN., § 11-7-15 (1972); see Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW 5 1411 (McKinney
1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp.
1976).
California, which judicially adopted comparative negligence (see note 109
supra), appears to apply it as well to products liability action. Cf. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976).
At least twenty-three states specifically provide that comparative negligence
is a defense to a negligence action: COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-21-111 (1975), see
Powell v. City of Ouray, 32 Colo. App. 44, 507 P.2d 1101 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. 5 52-572(h) (1973); GA. CODE ANN. 55 94-703, 105-603 (1972); HAW.
REV. STAT. 5 663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE 55 6-801 to 6-806 (1918); KAN.
STAT. 5 60-258a (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231 5 5 (West 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 604.01 (1969); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 5 58-607.1 (1975);
NEB. REV. STAT. 5 25-1151 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. 5 507.7a (1969); but see Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & CO., 110 N.H.
248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (West
Supp. 1977), but see Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence
Defense in Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restate-
ment of Torts 2nd (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 51 (1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 55 11-12 (1973);
see Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); OR. REV.
STAT. S 18.470 (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 5 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, 55 1, 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. 55
78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 5 1036 (1973); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 5 4.22.010 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1966); see Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
"' See note 16 supra.
"'See notes 113, 114, 115 infra.
"' Examples of the pure: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v.
Yellow Cab CO., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1972); N.Y. Civ. PlAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5
9-20-4 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 4.22.010 (Supp. 1977).
"*'Examples of the "not as great as" type (sometimes called the 49% sys-
tem): ARK. STAT. ANN. 55 27-1763 to 27-1765 (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §
94-703 (1972); IDAHO CODE 55 6-801 to 6-806 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 60-258a (1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, 5 156 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 55 11-12 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. 5 18.470 (1975); UTAH
CODE ANN. 55 78-27-37 (1977); and Wyo. STAT. 5 1-7.2 (Supp. 1975).
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is fifty per cent at fault, he may recover, but he cannot recover if
he is fifty-one per cent at fault."' Because of this substantial differ-
ence among the various jurisdictions, a Uniform Comparative Fault
Act has been drafted by the commissioners for the Uniform State
Law Commission under the guidance of Professor John Wade."
The commissioners have chosen to recommend the adoption of
"pure" comparative negligence." ' In the latest draft of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, comparative negligence supplants last
clear chance, implied assumption of risk, and similar common-law
and statutory provisions regarding contributory fault and applies
"'Examples of the "not greater than" type (sometimes called the 50% sys-
tem): CONN. GEN. STAT. S 52-572(h) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a
(Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1975); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 1036
(1973); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1977).
"' The Act provides:
SECTION 1. In a tort action for damages on the basis of negli-
gence, recklessness or strict liability, including statutory actions un-
less otherwise expressed or construed, contributory fault of the
plaintiff, or, in a derivative action the person injured or killed,
whether previously constituting a defense or not, does not necessar-
ily bar recovery, but the damages are diminished in proportion to
the amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff, the injured person
or the decedent.
SECTION 2. In a tort action involving contributory fault, the
court shall instruct the jury to give answers to special interrogatories
[render special verdicts], or make findings itself it [sic.] there is no
jury, which indicates:
(1) The amount of damages which would have been recover-
able if there had been no contributory fault,
(2) The percentage of the contributory fault for each plaintiff
as compared with the total fault of all of the parties to the action,
and
(3) The percentage of the fault of each defendant as com-
pared with the total fault of all of the parties to the action.
SECTION 3. This act does not change common law principles of
joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors. Contribution rights
among multiple defendants are determined in accordance with the
percentage of fault of each defendant, as found by the trier of fact.
The court enters judgments on the basis of these principles and the
findings made under Section 2.
SECTION 4. To the extent that liability insurance is available to
pay a judgment entered under this act the principle of set-off is not
applied.
SECTION 5. This act applies to all injuries incurred after the act
takes effect.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, First Tentative Draft (August, 1975);
See Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. &
COM. 107, 116 (1976).
117 Id.
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whether or not contributory fault previously constituted a de-
fense."'
During the same period of time that the different state courts
were struggling with the problems of developing rules of contribu-
tion and indemnity, strict products liability, and comparative negli-
gence, the federal courts began to fashion a body of federal com-
mon law of contribution. In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,"9 the
Seventh Circuit held that the allocation of contribution would be
on a comparative negligence basis. Kohr arose out of a midair col-
lision between a commercial aircraft owned by Allegheny Airlines
and a small private aircraft. Wrongful death actions or property
damage suits were initiated in various federal district courts against
Allegheny, the Federal Aviation Agency under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the estate of Carey (the student pilot of the small air-
craft), and the Forth Corporation (owner of the small aircraft and
instructor of Carey) as joint tort-feasors. Allegheny and the United
States filed cross-claims and third-party complaints against the
other defendants. Allegheny and the United States settled the
claims of all the plaintiffs. The district court dismissed claims by
Allegheny and the United States against the other defendants on
the ground that no right to indemnity or contribution existed under
Indiana law."' The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed and held
that a federal law of contribution or indemnity should control and
should be applied on a comparative negligence basis. 2' On the
same day the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kohr, it decided
an admiralty case involving the same issue. "' The Supreme Court
replaced the admiralty rule of dividing damages on a pro rata basis
with a rule requiring liability for maritime collision damages to be
allocated among the parties according to their degree of fault, a
holding very similar to that of the Seventh Circuit in Kohr. The
Supreme Court therein indicated that contribution in admiralty and
in certain aviation collision contexts was to be based upon propor-
tionate fault and not upon such arcane rationales as the "active-
passive" test or the "divided damages" test.
1 Id. at 117.
119 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
"O Id. at 402.
121 Id. at 405.
'2 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
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The soundness of the decision to create a federal common law
has been sharply challenged. The criticism has been tempered,
though, by a recognition of the strong federal interest in aviation
and by a recognition of the difficult problems facing courts and liti-
gants absent a federal rule. The Seventh Circuit in Kohr was faced
with a tempting opportunity. The alternatives open to the court
were to deny contribution from a joint tort-feasor to Allegheny
and the United States, or to radically change the complexion of
aircrash litigation and achieve an equitable apportionment of loss
among the parties. While violative of states' rights to promulgate
substantive tort law, and unsupported by the Rules of Decision
Act, the decision has focused attention, once again, on the desir-
ability of a uniform torts law for aviation litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present state of the law is unacceptable. In most jurisdic-
tions within the United States, the law is unsettled, and the hand-
ling of major aviation litigation necessarily requires an attempt to
forecast the forum court's ruling concerning choice of law princi-
ples, as well as a prediction of the applicable substantive law con-
cepts of strict liability, comparative negligence, and contribution,
without any concrete guidelines. This is because the forerunning
jurisdictions which have had an opportunity to address these prob-
lems have changed the substantive rules of law concerning prod-
ucts liability, comparative negligence, conflicts of law, and contri-
bution and indemnity on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis. There is no
satisfactory method to determine the law applicable to each case
in order to facilitate a prediction of the legal ramifications of one's
conduct. For this reason, a number of commentators have begun
espousing the need for the adoption of uniform rules.
One solution would be for Congress to adopt a substantive body
of law governing aviation litigation. The state courts do not have
sufficient jurisdiction to adopt uniform laws on a national basis,
and any attempt by the federal courts would unnecessarily encount-
er several problems. First, the courts attempting to fashion the law
of the case would be faced with having to analyze the effect of
the law on the rights of the parties before the court. Second, the
courts do not have the time or resources to make the necessary
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analysis of the policy decisions underpinning such a uniform rule
of law. Third, the various circuit courts within the United States
might arrive at different conclusions as to what the law should be,
leading to forum shopping and its associated inequities. Finally, the
courts' decisions would be subject to appeal, thereby further pro-
longing the enactment of a uniform law and leaving litigants in the
uncomfortable position of not knowing what the law is or will be.
Congress has the power to enact such legislation under the Com-
merce Clause, but seems to be in no mood to act. The last serious
attempt to enact a bill giving federal courts the exclusive jurisdic-
tion over major aviation litigation and providing a substantive body
of law to govern major aviation litigation was the introduction of
a bill by Senator Joseph Tydings in 1969.'" Overall support for the
bill was lacking, and the bill never left the Judiciary Committee fol-
lowing Senator Tydings' unsuccessful bid for reelection.
Although the Uniform Comparative Fault Acte'" is currently
being considered by Congress, the Act does not address some of
the problems set out and discussed in this paper and the Act
leaves a large amount of discretion to the states to determine
whether they wish to adopt the Act. Unfortunately, no easy solu-
tion appears to be in sight.
121S. RES. 961, 91st CONG., lST SESS., 115 CONG. REc. 3111, 20,253 (1969).
'
24 UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT, First Tentative Draft (August, 1975);
See Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIm L. &
CoM. 107, 116 (1976).
